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One of the most controversial Civil War political figures in North 
Carolina was William W. Holden, editor of the powerful Raleiph, North 
Carolina Standard, member consecutively of four political parties, and 
reconstruction governor of North Carolina.  Holden has been cenerallv re- 
garded as a politically ambitious and unscrupulous man, as well as some- 
thing of a traitor for his role as advocate of pence during the Civil 
War. 
Holden, trained in newspaper work from boyhood, left the Whig partv 
in 1843 to accept the editorship of the Standard, the Democratic partv 
organ in Raleigh.  He rapidly built it into the larrest paper in the 
state and became a leader in the Democratic partv, and one of its more 
liberal voices.  Originally a defender of the right of secession, his 
liberal position on other matters and his humble origins had led bv 
1860 to his alienation from the leadership of his party, and from the 
slaveholding interest in North Carolina. 
During the Democratic National Convention of 1860 at Charleston and 
Baltimore and through the secession crisis which followed, Holden worked 
for the maintenance of the Union.  With the firing on Fort Sumter and 
Lincoln's call for troops, he joined his state in secession, but rapidly 
became disillusioned with the Confederate cause, and devoted his efforts 
to securing peace.  From the first months of the war onward, tha pares of 
the Standard were filled with accusations of partisanship in both state 
and Confederate Governments, particularly in the exclusion of former 
Union men  from  power,   charges  that   the war was  a  "rich man's war  and  a 
poor man's  fight",   complaints that North Carolina was being unfairly 
treated by   the Confederacy,   and warnings  that   the  Confederate  govern- 
ment was  infringing  the   rights of   both states   and  individuals. 
Holden's  position  found  considerable   support   in North  Carolina,   as 
evidenced  bv  Vis  growing   subscription  list,   and   led   to efforts  both 
official   and  unofficial,   to  suppress  the  paper.     He maintained his  position 
throughout   the war,   however,  with  only occasional  modifications,   and  at 
the   end of   the conflict was appointed  reconstruction  governor bv  President 
Johnson. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial figures of the Civil War period in 
North Carolina was William Woods Holden, editor for a quarter of a 
century of the (Raleigh) North Carolina Standard, member, at one time or 
another, of four political parties and a leader in three, and the only 
governor of the state ever to be impeached. 
As an editor, Holden had few eouals.  It was generally acknowledged 
that the Standard, from the standpoint of craftsmanship, was the finest 
paper in the state, and it was equaled in influence, if at all, only by 
E. J. Hale's Fayettevllle Observer. Holden possessed the ability, both 
valuable and dangerous in an editor, to seem to be always in the right. 
His command of language was remarkable.  He was capable of passages of 
great strength, and equally caDable of descending to the maudlin or ab- 
surd if the situation demanded.  He always orofessed to be guided by the 
will of the oeople, and thus was able to effect changes of position with- 
out the slightest appearance of inconsistency.  In times of extraordinary 
confusion, this served him well.  In the secession crisis in 1860-61, for 
example, he could swing with the popular will from an anti-secession to a 
pro-secession position, retaining the loyalty of most of his subscribers 
throughout.  He was, as his contemporary, Cornelia Phillips Soencer, 
observed, a man "who thoroughly understood his business, and who always 
kept his nowder dry."1 
*The Last Ninety Days of the War in North Carolina (New York: Watch- 
man Publishing Company, 1866), op. 246-247. 
Holden was equally able as a political leader.  A member consecutively 
of the Whig, Democratic, Conservative, and Republican parties, he olayed 
a major role in bringing the last three into power in North Carolina, 
and was regarded as a man who could " kill and make alive" in North Caro- 
lina politics.2 
Holden's rather frequent changes of party, and his adoption of con- 
troversial positions, particularly during the Civil War, have led to a 
general tendency among historians of the period to discount him as an 
unscrupulous and se'f-seeking demagogue.   Two periods in his career, in 
particular, have contributed to this im->ression--his activities during the 
Civil War as the leader of the anti-Confederate peace movement, and his 
role as post-war Republican governor of the state.  Holden's actions in 
the first case have thus far been treated in very general terms.  His 
enemies hold him responsible in large measure for the ever-increasing 
despondency and disaffection with the Southern cause which marked North 
Carolina's relations with the Confederacy.  Less hostile students generally 
concede that his position to a great extent reflected  rather than created 
public opinion in the state.  What neither group has done thus far is to 
document in any detail what, precisely, Holden was doing.  It is the pur- 
pose of this study to do this--to examine the kinds of material appearing 
in the Standard during the secession crisis and the war, and to trace the 
development of the various themes which, whatever their intent, appear 
to have reflected fairly accurately the sentiment of much of the population 
of North Carolina during the Civil War. 
2J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1914), p. 6. 
3See for example the work by Hamilton cited above and his "William 
Woods Holden", Dictionary of American Biography, IX (New York: Scribner's, 
1928-1937.), 138-140. 
CHAPTER  I 
EDITOR  HOLDEN 
William Woods   Holden was born   in   1818  near   Hillsboro,   North Carolina, 
the   illegitimate son  of gristmill  owner Thomas   Holden and   Priscilla 
Woods.     His   father   later married  Sally Nichols   and  took  his   son  to   live 
with  him.     Of   formal   education young   Holden  had  almost   none,   jeing 
apprenticed  at   the  age of   ten to  Dennis   Heartt,   editor  of   the Hillsboro 
Recorder,   a Whig publication.       He worked briefly  for  two  other  news- 
papers—one   in Milton,   North Carolina,   and  the   other   in Danville, 
Virginia — and   in   1837  gained employment  as  a  typesetter   for  the  Raleigh 
Star,   one  of  the two Whig   organs   in  the capital.     He   remained with the 
Star  four  years,   becoming   associate  editor  of   the  oaper.       During   these 
years   he  studied   law,   receiving  his   license  to   practice   in  the  county 
courts   in   1841.        In  the  same year he married Anne Young  of  Raleigh,   a 
niece  of   the  founder  of   Peace Institute,   a well-known  preparatory  school 
for women.     This match to   some extent   offset   his own   lack  of  social 
standing,   as  Miss   Youne  had  some measure of  both wealth and position. 
4Horace W.   Raper,   "William Woods   Holden:   A PoliticaL   Biography"   (Un- 
published   Ph.   D.   dissertation,   Department   of   History,   University of 
North Carolina at  Chapel   Hill),   p.   2. 
5William K.   Boyd,   "William W.   Holden."   Historical   Papers  of   the Trinity 
College Historical   Society,   Ser.   Ill   (Durham:   The Seeman  Printery,   1899), 
p.   43. 
6Raper,   p.   6. 7Boyd,   p.   45. 
Perhaps as a result of his chance association with Whig newspapers, 
Holden was, during these years, active in Whig politics in the state. 
In 1843, however, the Democratic party leadership, faced with Whig ascend- 
ancy in North Carolina and lacking a strong party editor, offered Holden 
the editorship of the North Carolina Standard, which he accented. 
Borrowing the money for the purchase, he became the owner of the paper 
Q 
as well.   He thus abandoned the Whigs and became the official voice of 
the Democratic oarty.  It has generally been charged that he changed his 
political association for Dersonal gain, but this seems an insufficient 
explanation, as the fortunes of both paper and party left much to be 
desired.  Holden himself, in his first editorial, affirmed that he had 
been for some time in sympathy with the Democrats, as they had "always 
approved themselves the friends and supporters of equal rights, because 
they have ever been, and are now, the advocates of the many against the 
few; because [theyj guard with peculiar vigilance the freedom, sover- 
9 
eignity, and independence of the respective states.'- 
This statement is in harmony with Holden's position, throughout his 
career, as the advocate of the interests of the common man, but there 
probably were other considerations as well.  He had, by this time, come 
under the influence of John C. Calhoun,   and it may well be, also, that 
he  felt that the inconvenient circumstance of his birth, which was to 
embarass him politically on more than one occasion, precluded his ever 
achieving genuine prominence in the Whig party.  Whatever his motives, 
8Clarence C. Norton, The Democratic Party in Ante-Bellum North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930), p. 18. 
9North Carolina Standard, June 7, 1843. 
10Boyd, pp. 47, 58. 
both Holden and the Democratic Party were to profit from his choice. 
When he assumed editorship of the Standard in 1843, the Democratic 
party in North Carolina, Holden later declared, numbered no more than 
eight thousand, and "in a social sense...were regarded as no more than 
the scalawags...", while "the Whigs were mainly in the towns and villages, 
and it was claimed that they possessed a large portion of all the 'in- 
telligence and all the decency'."   The Democratic record on matters 
such as public education and publicly financed internal imprrvements, 
both favored by the Whigs, was negative, and the party had suffered fre- 
12 
quent defeats since 1835.   The Standard, as was to be expected, was ex- 
periencing similiar misfortunes, with a subscription list of about eight 
hundred—much of it unpaid—and a negligible amount of advertising. 
With marked editorial ability, Holden rapidly brought the Standard 
to a position of influence in the state, and became himself a leader in 
the Democratic party. 
At the end of...six months cafter assuming the editor- 
ship]...! perceived a sudden and great quickening in my sub- 
scription.  I realized the fact that the Democratic party 
trusted me thoroughly and fully.13 
In the election of 1844, Holden campaigned vigorously for the 
election of James K. Polk, emphasing the Texas annexation issue, which 
14 His he correctly judged to be the strongest aspect of the platform 
major contribution to the campaign was the publication of a secret cir- 
Hwilliam W. Holden, Memoirs (Durham: The Seeman Printery, 1911), 
pp. 96-97. 
12 
14 
Norton, p. 69. 
Raper, p. 14. 
13 Holden, p. 97, 
cular  from Whig  party  headquarters.     The circular appears   to have been 
fairly  routine,   denouncing  the  Democratic party  and  platform as  dis- 
unionist,   and  urging Whigs   to get  out   the vote and to watch the  polls 
against   Democratic   frauds.     Its   language was   somewhat   intemperate,   how- 
ever,   and   in   the  hands  of   Holden and  the Democratic  press,   it  became an 
effective campaign weapon. 
The Democrats   failed  to carry North Carolina   in   1844 by about 3,500 
votes,   but   as   this was   a   smaller margin of  defeat   than that  of   the   1840 
election,   the party   leadership was   encouraged.     The  gubernatorial   election 
that  year was   lost   to   the Whigs   by a   smaller margin  of approximately 
3,000 votes,   and   the   1845   congressional   elections brought   even more 
16 
gratifving   results,   as   the  Democrats  won  six   of  the nine  districts. 
After   a   severe   set-back  in   1846,  when Governor Graham was   re-elected by 
a  majority  of   7,000 votes,        the party   continued to make gains  over  the 
next   several   years,  with   Holden apparently partly  responsible   for a more 
popular  approach  to campaigning.     In   1845,   he himself  sucessfully  ran 
18 
for a   seat   in  the North Carolina   House  of  Representatives. 
In   1848,   Holden was   instrumental   in securing the gubernatorial 
19 
nomination of  David  Settle Reid,   on a   free-suffrage platform. The 
issue  of   free  suffrage,   introduced by  Reid   in   bit   opening campaign 
speech  at  New  Bern,   and opposed by  the Whig candidate,  Charles  Manly, 
15Boyd,   pp.   47-48. 
16Norton, pp. 142-148. 
17Boyd, D. 51. 
18Raper, p. 15. 
l9Ibid., Dp. 17-18.  In this case, "free-suffrage" referred to the 
aboliti'oTrof property qualifications in voting for state senators. 
' 
was, Holden later declared, the issue which "sealed the fate of the Whig 
party in North Carolina....11   Actually the decline in Whig strength in 
North Carolina had broader causes.  The party had been in trouble since 
1844, when Whig objections to the annexation of Texas had alienated 
many North Carolinians.  Opposition to the Mexican War, and the internal 
divisions of the national party over the slavery question and particularly 
over the Wilmot Proviso increased the difficulties of the Whigs in North 
Carolina, and provided the Democrats with ample opportunity for progress. 
Reid lost tie election in 1848 by 894 votes, but ran again in 1850 
on the same platform, which now incorporated a call for the popular 
election of judges.  He won this time by a margin of almost 3,000 votes. 
The Democratic victory in 1850 ended Whig control of North Carolina, and 
brought to Holden recognition as a leader in the party.  He was rewarded 
for his services with the position of state printer, a job which he held 
from 1850 to 1860, clearing approximately eieht thousand dollars yearly 
22 from this source. 
In addition to his support of free suffrage, Holden favored many 
causes of a popular, and for the times,libera1, nature.  He worked for 
an improved public school system, despite previous Democratic opposition, 
introducing the issue into the 1848 elections, and advocatine several 
reforms such as an increased number of normal schools and the establishment 
of state-wide teacher institutes.  During his term in the State House of 
Representatives, he sponsored a sucessful measure providing for construction 
in Raleigh of facilities for the deaf and dumb.  He later served as a 
commissioner both of the Deaf and Dumb Institution and of the State 
20Holden, pp. 5-6.     21Raper, pp. 18-20. 
22Holden, p. 98. 
Asylum for the Insane.  In a similiar vein, but unsucessfully, he urged 
the establishment of a state penitentiary system for the reform rather 
23 
than the punishment of criminals. 
Holden also supported government-financed internal improvements, 
especially railroads, again reversing the former position of the 
24 
Democratic party.    His Dosition on this issue and on the questions of 
free suffrage and public education doubtless accounted for much of his 
popularity in the western part of the state, where all of these issues 
were popular. 
25 
While Holden apparently was himself a slave-holder,   and before 
1860 was "sound" on the slavery question, he apoears to have looked for- 
ward to an industrial economy in North Carolina. 
The South must also look more and more to the develop- 
ment of her resources, and to building uo seaports and mar- 
kets within her limits.  To this end, systems of internal 
improvements should be pushed forward, and agriculture, 
mining, manufacture, and the arts generally promoted and 
encouraged.26 
Throughout his career he declared himself the friend of the artisan or 
mechanic class.  In a remarkable editorial of October 1, 1345, he upheld 
the dignity of common labor, as he did frequently: 
Raper, p. 18-20.  A state penitentiary system was established by 
the Reconstruction constitution of 1868, and construction began during 
Holden's term as governor of North Carolina. 
24Ibid., o. 20. 
25There is some disagreement on this matter.  Henry M. Wagstaff, in 
his State Rights and Political Parties in North Carolina (Baltimore, The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1906), p. 127, states that Holden was never a slave- 
holder, but Raper (p. 29) cites an article from the Raleigh Times, re- 
printed in the Standard of March 27, 1850, which lists Holden as the 
owner of 190 slaves.  In addition, the Standard itself, June 4, 1862, 
carried an advertisement for a runaway slave belonging to the editor, 
so it seems likely that Holden, perhaps through his wife's family, did 
own some slaves, though probably not as many as 190. 
When will the davs of sentimentalitv be over in North 
Carolina?  When will those of our younp, men who are now fash- 
ionable idlers, cease to be so, and turn their hands either 
to farming or to some useful branch of the mechanics?... 
Here, as in many other portions of the country, the pro- 
fessions are crowded.  Shall we crowd them still more, and 
thus encourage quackery and petti fogging, while our lands 
are neglected and our workshops silent?  Let the truth be 
taught to our children as a house-hold work, that labor is 
honorable--labor of the hands, as well as of the head.... 
Labor must ultimately take the place of idleness, and 
the refinements and elegancies of life will then be left to 
take care of themselves.  The radicalism of labor, which makes 
men of all the masses, is coming on aDace.  Capital is now 
the strong arm, as labor will be then. 7 
In later years, as Holden drifted away from the aristocratic wing 
of the Democratic party, he associated himself more and more with the 
interests of the laboring class.  He was active in forming the Raleigh 
Workingmen's Association in 1858, and freruently participated in its 
activities.28 
Despite his increasing association with the "common man" interest 
in his party, Holden, in the years before 1860, upheld the Southern 
position on the two-headed question of slavery and secession.  He de- 
fended secession as "an original, pre-existing, reserved sovereign 
right," and declared that "whenever the Constitution is palpably vio- 
lated by Congress or whenever that body fails to carry out the plain 
provisions of that instrument when required to orotect Southern rights, 
the Union is dissolved...."29 
His position, however, seems to have varied somewhat with the 
27Standard, quoted in Raper, pp. 20-21. 
28William K. Boyd, "Ad Valorem Slave Taxation, 1858-1860," Historical 
Papers of the Trinity College Historical Society, Ser. V (Durham: The 
Seeman Printery, 1905), pp. 34-35. 
29Standard, January 15, 1851, quoted in Joseph Carlyle Sitterson, 
The Secession Movement in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 91. 
10 
political current in the state.  The Standard was among several North 
Carolina newspapers favoring the Southern Rights Convention at Nashville 
in 1850, but when public opinion in favor of the meeting failed to 
materialize, Holden dropped his support for it, regarding it as a dead 
issue.33 Again in 1851, when the fall congressional elections showed a 
popular preference for "union" men, the Standard, while not denying the 
right of secession "in the last resort", declared that the exercise of 
that right was "quite another tiling". '  In 1856, with the candidacy of 
Fremont, Holden became more emphatic in his defense of "Southern Rights", 
holding that the election of a "Black Republican" president would be 
32 sufficient grounds for disunion.    Thus he maintained the right of se- 
cession throughout the period, but varied on the advisability of exer- 
cising that right at a given time. 
With the gubernatorial election of 1858, Holden's political career 
reached a crisis.  Having contributed much to the party's return to dom- 
inance in North Carolina, he sought for himself the Democratic nomination 
for governor that year.  He was opposed by John W. Ellis of Salisbury, 
and out of this struggle arose a party split which was to place Holden 
in opposition to much of the leadership of the party.  The convention, 
meeting at Charlotte in April, was controlled by the Ellis forces.  Thus 
a rule was adopted to give each county a vote equivalent to its Democratic 
vote in 1856.  As the eastern counties had cast a heavier vote in that 
election, this measure worked to the advantage of Ellis, who was a more 
acceptable candidate to the Eastern slave-holders, while the bulk of 
30 Raper, p. 30. 
31Standard, October 1, 15, 1851, quoted in Sitterson, p. 93. 
32lbid., September 17, 24; October 25, 1856, quoted in Sitterson, p. 135. 
11 
Holden's support lay in the West.  The Holden forces, seeing themselves 
outnumbered, and hoping to create a deadlock which might ultimately re- 
sult in the nomination of their candidate, proposed to make the nomi- 
nation dependent on a two-thirds majority.  This measure was defeated in 
favor of a sim-le majority requirement. "  The nomination went to Ellis, 
25,951 to 21,594, with the votes of three eastern and twenty-seven western 
counties going to Holden. 
It has generally been assumed that Holden was defeated because of 
his anti-aristocratic position and his association with the more equal- 
itarian portion of the party. "  The large number of former Whigs who 
had by then gravitated into the party may also have affected his chances, 
as he had been a major factor in their fall from power in the state. 
Holden himself felt that he had been unfairly dealt with, but continued 
to support the party, campaigning actively for Ellis.  Despite this 
effort on his part, he was again passed over by his party when he attempted 
to gain a seat in the United States Senate in 1858,  and by the following 
year, reporters from the Standard were being excluded from Democratic 
party meetings in Raleigh. 
During these years Holden apparently reappraised the political 
33 Norton, pp. 230-231. 
3AStandard,  April   21,   1858. 
35Boyd   ("W.   W.   Holden",   p.   56),   Norton   (p.   231),   Raper   (p.   43),   and 
Wagstaff   (p.   101),   all assume  that   this was  a major  factor.     Holden's 
political   opposition at  the time  also  adhered  to   this  view.     The   (Whig) 
Raleigh Register,   April   14,   1868,   quoted   in Raper,   p.   42,   observed  that 
"the   lawyers  and upper crust   generally are  for   Ellis,  while the unwashed 
multitudes  are  for   Holden." 
36Wagstaff,   p.   103. 
37Boyd,   "W.   W.   Holden,"  p.   57. 
12 
climate in the state, as well as his situation in the Democratic party, 
and moved toward a new position.  It was evident that he did not enjoy 
the favor of much of the leadership of his party.  It was becoming equally 
evident that that leadership did not enjoy the favor of the majority of 
North Carolinians, to whom the interests of the slave-holding minority 
were not vital.  While Holden did not break openly with the Democratic 
leaders until 1861, and although he continued to support Democratic 
candidates, he became associated more and more with the non-slaveholding 
wing of the partv.  He moved away from his militant position on "Southern 
Rights" and secession, and when the issue of ad valorem taxation of 
slaves was raised in 1858 by Moses A. Bledsoe of Wake County, it received 
his support.  As the tax on slaves in North Carolina consisted of a 
simple head tax of forty cents, while the tax on land and other property 
was considerably higher, small landowners and artisans felt that they 
were discriminated against.  Although Holden did not publicly support 
the ad valorem scheme until 1860, he favored and encouraged it in 1858, 
and one campaign sheet, the Adder, was published from his office by his 
former associate editor, Frank I. Wilson.    By the critical year 1860, 
Holden had abandoned his defense of the slaveholding interest and had 
adopted a strongly pro-union position.  Having puolicly upheld the right 
of secession for almost two decades, he now became North Carolina's most 
vocal opponent of the exercise of that right. 
38 Boyd,   "Ad Valorem Slave Taxation...",   p.   35. 
CHAPTER II 
SECESSION--1860-1861 
Holden was a delegate to the Democratic National Convention which 
met at Charleston and Baltimore in April and June, 1860.  Of his political 
position at that time he noted in his Memoirs: 
I was jealous for the so-called rights of the South 
on the question of slavery, and greatly concerned at the 
apparently impending election of a sectional candidate 
for the Presidency. 
But I was not a Secessionist nor a Revolutionist.  I 
was strongly attached to the union of the states, and 
felt myself to be a national man 39 
The convention met at Charleston in an atmosphere of crisis, with the 
delegates from the deep South determined to secure a platform embodying 
their demands, and with a bloc of northern Democrats committed to Douglas 
40 
strong enough to prevent any action which their candidate opposed. 
After serious disagreements over matters of organization, the sections 
collided on the fourth day on the adoption of a platform.  Three reports 
were presented by the platform committee.  The majority report, embodying 
the demands of the Southern extremists, denied the power of Congress or 
39Holden, p. 10. 
40Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1931) pp. 35-37.  Of the delegates committed to Douglas, one- 
hundred twenty, more than one third of the total convention, came from 
states in which the popular vote of Lincoln was to exceed that of all 
other candidates combined.  This fact led to considerable resentment 
among Southerners, who felt that this group, which could not hope to 
elect the President, should not control the nomination. 
14 
of territorial legislatures to exclude slavery from the territories, 
and demanded Congressional protection of Southern "property" in the 
territories.  Over the opposition of the Southern delegates, including 
those from North Carolina, this olatform was rejected in favor of the 
first minority report, which retained the Cincinnati Platform of 1856, 
adhering to the doctrine of popular sovereignty.  A second resolution, 
promising to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases 
involving slavery in the territories, was defeated bv the Douglas bloc. 
With the adoption of the minority report, the delegations from Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas left the convention, along 
with the majority of the delegates from South Carolina, Arkansas, and 
Georgia.    During the bolt, Holden spoke in opposition to such action. 
I spoke for ten minutes. I told 
been sent there by the state of N 
four delegates at large; that I c 
any steps looking to dis-union; t 
to maintain and preserve, and not 
the union; that by an immense maj 
state..."would frown indignantly 
every attempt to alienate any por 
the rest, or to enfeeble the sacr 
gether the various parts."** 
the convention that I had 
orth-Carolina, one of the 
ould not be a party to 
hat my party had sent me 
destroy, the bonds of 
ority the oeoDle of my 
on the first dawning of 
tion of our Country from 
ed ties which link to- 
The North Carolina delegation refused to join the bolt, as did the 
representatives of the other border states. 
The remainder of the convention, failing after fifty-seven ballots 
to choose a oresidential nominee, adjourned to meet at Baltimore on 
June 18, 1860. 
Holden, in his defense of the Union at Charleston, apparently 
41Ibid., pp. 50-54.  In addition, two of the delegates from Delaware 
left the convention. 
*2Holden, pp. 13-14. 
15 
guaged correctly the sentiment of North Carolina Democrats at the time, 
as the action of the delegation in refusing to leave the convention 
seems to have been generally approved in the state, both in the party 
press and in county meetings.  The moderate attitude of the state was 
reflected also in a growth in support for Douglas after the Charleston 
convention. 
The first question to be considered by the reconvened convention at 
Baltimore was the status of those delegates who had bolted at Charleston. 
With the adoption of the majority report on this issue, which held that 
the seats of the seceding delegates were vacant unless refilled by a 
second action of their constituents, and which, in the case of some 
states, seated delegates objectionaole to the Southern members of the 
convention; majorities of the delegations of Virginia, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Kentucky left the convention.  The remaining delegates 
then nominated Douglas.   Of the three North Carolina delegates refusing 
to join this second walkout, J. W. B. Watson and Holden abstained from 
voting, while R. P. Dick cast his vote for Douglas. 
The representatives of tie seventeen wholly or partially disaffected 
states met at Baltimore on June 23, nominating John C. Breckenridge of 
Kentucky and Joseph Lane of Oregon, and adopting the pro-Southern majority 
43Sitterson, p. 165-167. 
44Dumond, pp. 82-91.  There remained in the convention thirteen 
full state delegations and partial delegations of seven states.  The 
delegates of Oregon, California, and Massachusetts had also left — the 
first two to protest the refusal of the Douglas forces to permit a com- 
promise which might save the party, and the last to protest the seating 
of R. L. Chaffee in the Dlace of the regularly chosen Massachusetts 
delegate, B. F. Hallett, for whom Chaffee had substituted at Charleston. 
45Sitterson, p. 167. 
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46 platform report from the Charleston Convention. 
The outcome of the Baltimore convention left the Democratic party 
in North Carolina badly divided, although the majority evidently pre- 
ferred the Breckenridge ticket.    Holden himself favored Douglas, taking 
the position that he was properly nominated, and was more likely to de- 
feat Lincoln,  but as it became apparent that Breckenridge was the 
stronger candidate in North Carolina, he agreed to support him, suggesting 
however that the electors be directed to vote for whichever candidate 
appeared more likely to win. 
Toward the end of the campaign, as it became increasincly apparent 
that Lincoln would be elected, mounting concern over the proper course 
for North Carolina to follow was expressed in the state.  The majority 
of the people apparently felt that the mere election of Lincoln would 
not be sufficient cause for secession, but many feared that the secession 
of at least the deep South might be the result.    Holden shared this 
apprehension and urged continually that Lincoln's election would not be 
cause for disunion.  At the same time he declared himself opposed to 
any attempt of the Federal Government to coerce such states as might 
secede. 
On the day following the election, with the returns not yet in, 
Holden marked his future position on secession, declaring that "if Mr. 
Lincoln was elected yesterday, it will be the duty of the Southern people 
...to strengthen their defenses in the Union...."  He pointed out that 
even with a Republican presidential victory, only one of the three de- 
46Dumond, o. 91.    47Sitterson, p. 168-169.    ^Standard, July 4, 1860. 
49Ibji'» July 18, 1860.   50Sitterson, p. 172-173. 
51Standard, September, October, 1860. 
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partraents of the government would be inimicable to Southern interests, 
and urged that Lincoln was intelligent enough to see the danger in any 
action which would "touch in the slightest respect the vital interests 
of the slave-holding States." '  When the results of the election were 
known, the secessionists called for immediate withdrawal from the Union. 
Holden, while denying that he was a "submissionist", continued to plead 
for caution: 
The condition of the times calls for calmness of deter- 
mination and firmness of action.  Let passion be discarded. 
The foundations of a State, to be enduring must not be laid 
in passion or resentment.  It is much easier to destroy than 
it is to construct.  "Better to bear the ills we have, than 
fly to others that we know not of."-'-* 
We stand like a rock against both disunion and sub- 
mission.  With both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court 
in our favor, we will try Mr. Lincoln....  Let us then, Watch 
and Wait.54 
Through the secession crisis, until the Confederate assault on 
Fort Sumter, this was to be the position of the Standard.  Adopting the 
words "watch and wait" as his motto, Holden upheld the abstract right of 
secession for cause, but continued to insist that there was not yet 
cause sufficient. 
While the majority of North Carolinians, both Whig and Democratic, 
apparently shared Holden's view, there was in the state a group favoring 
immediate secession, strongest in the counties having the largest slave 
population, and counting Governor Ellis among its leaders. "  Not until 
Lincoln's call for troops, when it became evident that the state would 
52 53. Ibid., November 7, 1860.     Ibid., November 14, 1860. 
55, 54Ibid.,   November 2b,   1860. "sitterson,   pp.   180-181 
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be forced to choose a side in the impending conflict, were the secess- 
ionists in North Carolina able to muster sufficient public opinion for 
action, but the winter of 1860-1861 was marked by the efforts of this 
group to wrest control of the state from the conservative union group. 
On November 20, Governor Ellis delivered a message to the legis- 
lature suggesting among other things a conference of the Southern states 
and a convention in North Carolina to consider the question of secession. 
Holden placed himself at the forefront of the anti-secessionists, 
charging that the existing situation did not call for such action. 
There are portions...of the Governor's message to which 
we earnestly and respectfully object.  We regard portions of 
it as tending to disunion without good cause, and we fear 
that the purpose of the Governor is to "precipitate" the 
State into the same position occupied bv South-Carolina.i6 
He warned the people that control of the Democratic party had fallen to 
the secessionists, and cautioned them to resist the efforts of these men 
to bring about disunion.  Urging the necessity of purging this element 
from the party, Holden suggested that the desire for high public office 
had something to do with the demands for an independent South. 
Through December and January, Holden continued to urge his policy 
of "watch and wait", and to defend himself against mounting charges that 
he had abandoned the Democratic party and become a "submissionist". 
Frequently declaring that the majority of the people of North Carolina 
remained opposed to secession, he announced his intention to be bound by 
their will.  "Our anneal is to them.  Their decision shall be law to us." 
He professed to see a growing willingness in the North to respect the 
58 
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position of the South, urging that they be given time to act,59 and sug- 
eesting that a national constitutional convention be held, at which the 
border states could act as mediators. 
At the same time, Holden began what was to be a recurring theme in 
his war-time campaign, the idea that this would be a "rich man's war and 
a poor roan's fight." Declaring that secession was certain to result in 
war, he charged, "Those who are making the most noise for secession have 
no idea of serving in the ranks as 'high privates.'  They must be Captains, 
Colonels, and Generals.  Of course the honest, hard working people will 
61 
have to foot the bill." 
In the beginning of January considerable excitement was generated in 
the state by the abortive seizure of Forts Caswell and Johnson, on the 
Cape Fear, by citizens of Wilmington.  At Governor Ellis* order, the 
forts were returned to Federal authorities without bloodshed on either 
side,02 but this action and the apprehension that the forts might be 
garrisoned with Federal troops led to the passage of a measure, on 
January 30, 1861, calling for a vote for or against a convention to con- 
sider the question of secession, and for the election of delegates to 
attend this convention, if held.  Although he had previously opposed 
the idea of a convention,  Holden reacted favorably to the passage of 
the bill, apparently feeling that Union sentiment in the state would 
prevail in such a convention, a manifestation which would greatly hinder 
59Ibid., December 6,8,11,13,15,18,20,29,1860; January 2,23,30,1861. 
60Ibid., January 2, 1861.     61Ibid., January 23, 1861. 
62John G. Barrett, The Civil War in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1963), op. 5-8. 
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the secessionist cause. '  He called for the election of the strongest 
possible union men, oeing himself a candidate, and emphasized that the 
issue was not one of party, but one of union or disunion.   At the same 
time he intensified his campaign against the secessionists, broadening 
his "rich man's war" theme into a general threat of aristocratic govern- 
ment and loss of civil liberty.  Noting that none of the seceded  states 
had submitted its action to a popular vote, he declared: 
The oligarchs are afraid to trust the ballot box.  But 
it will not be so in this state.... 
Are we ready for aristocracies, high taxes, military 
rule, and general poverty and want? If so, let us go now 
for disunion.... 
But what if cthe Republic^ should perish!  Mark it, 
good reader—mark itJ--civil liberty, as it has been known 
and enjoyed in England and America, will perish with it.... 
Equally threatening was Holden's persistent warning that secession would 
mean war, chaos, the ruin of industry, and finally--abolition. 
With the vote on the convention bill returning a majority of union 
delegates, including Holden, but rejecting the idea of a convention, the 
editor again declared himself the voice of the people, observing with 
some satisfaction that they had adopted his "watch and wait" slogan as 
their own.66  He continued to call for a peaceful settlement within the 
Union, and to urge Union men to remain alert, as the secessionists were 
"Holden, in his Memoirs, p. 15. recounts a meeting on the day of 
the election with a fellow Union candidate, G. E. Badger to whom he 
exoressed his confidence that 80 union and 40 secession delegates would 
be' elected.  The actual numbers were 83 union and 37 secession. 
64 
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determined to ignore the will of the majority. 
The will of the majority was fast changing, however.  The failure 
of the peace convention at Washington, D. C. to achieve results hecame 
known shortly after the election, and discouraged many North Carolina 
unionists who had looked to it for some peaceful solution.  Lincoln's 
inaugural address, which Holden declared was not unfriendly to the 
South--"It deprecates war and bloodshed, and it pleads for the Union"-- 
was interpreted by most North Carolinians as a warning that coercion 
in 
would be employed against the seceded states. 
Encouraged by the growing disillusionment with the cause of union, 
North Carolina secessionists became more active.  County meetings and 
rallies were hgld around the state, and a call was issued for a conven- 
tion of the "Southern Rights Party" to meet at Goldsboro, March 22-23. 
This meeting, attended by more than one thousand persons, served to 
organize the secessionists, who then began to campaign for a new con- 
vention bill.69 
With the confrontation at Fort Sumter, Holden charged that the ex- 
tremists, North and South, were dragging the country to ruin.  He con- 
demned the Confederate action in firing on Sumter as an attempt to force 
secession on the border states.  At the same time, however, he reaffirmed 
his opposition to coercion.  The proper course for the border states now, 
he declared, was to continue to try to "command the peace;' but to resist 
70 
any attempt of the North to coerce the Southern states. 
Lincoln's call for troops, making it evident that coercion was to 
be applied, and the secession of Virginia on Aoril 17, led Holden--and 
67Ibid., March 13, 1861.   68Sitterson, pp. 231-232. 
69I'jid., pp. 235-237.    70Standard, April 17, 1861. 
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with him, North Carolina unionists almost to a man—to renounce the 
motto "watch and wait"--"We must now UNITE and ACT."  Declaring the call 
for troops a proclamation of war, unjustified even by the Confederate 
"error" in firing on Sumter, he announced: 
One heretofore for peace and the Union comes forward 
to say to you that this is a just and honorable war.  It 
is a war which could not have been avoided.  It has been 
forced upon us.  We must fight! 
With this declaration, Holden dropped his charges against the se- 
cessionists and the Confederacy, but continued to demand that the 
questions of secession and of union with the Confederacy be put to a 
oopular vote.  "The people should be fully consulted.  The State can act 
with deliberation and dignity even in the midst of war."  Joining a 
72 
militia company formed for lacal defense of Raleigh,   he devoted the 
Standard to rallying North Carolina to the cause of the South.  He served 
as a delegate to the Convention which passed the ordinance of secession 
on May 20, 1861, voting for the measure.  Of his role in the secession 
convention, Holden later wrote, "I with others signed the ordinance of 
secession under force of unavoidable circumstances." 
71Ibid., April 24, 1861.    72Ibid., May 1, 1861. 
73Holden, p. 52. 
CHAPTER III 
THEMES OF DIVISION 
For a brief period after the secession of North Carolina, Holden 
gave his full support to the Confederate cause.  "Out course is set, our 
purpose is fixed, to do our whole duty to North-Carolina and the South, 
74 
at all hazards."   Almost every issue of the Standard noted newly or- 
ganized companies of volunteers with praise, and encouraged North Caro- 
linians to organize and arm.  Holden did not long maintain his new 
course, however.  Within weeks after the secession of the state, notes 
of dissatisfaction began to appear in the Standard, developing by 1863 
into a full scale attack on the war effort.  Much of this material was 
of a sort likely to encourage dissatisfaction within the state toward 
both the state and the Confederate governments.  Such material included 
accusations of partisanship in government and charges that North Carolina 
was being unfairly treated by the Confederate government, that the war 
was "a rich man's war, and a poor man's fight", and that the Confederate 
Government was infringing upon the rights and liberties of the state and 
of the individual citizen.  Holden was by no means the originator of 
much of this discontent, as these views were widely held in North Carolina, 
but he played a leading role in converting this general dissatisfaction 
into political action. 
The first-mentioned of these divisive themes, the charge of partis- 
7AStandard, June 5, 1861. 
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anship, is to be found for the most part in the early years of the war, 
and is devoted primarily to a defense of former Union men, including 
Holden himself, against imputations of disloyalty and against exclusion 
from participation in the government.  From the beginning of the war, 
the Standard  denied runors of the existence of a "union league" or of a 
large :>ody of disloyal citizens in North Carolina, attributing such 
rumors to the Northern press and to "cowardly original secessionists" 
within the state. "  When forced to acknowledge that such a group appar- 
ently did exist, Holden hastened to deny that former union men were among 
the disloyal.    Announcing the coming election of Confederate Congressmen 
and Presidential Electors in the fall of 1861, he urged that former Union 
men not be proscribed, and called for the rejection of aprty spirit--"next 
to the abolitionists...the worst enemy North-Carolina ever had...." 
Simultaneously, the Standard attacked the "original secessionists" or 
"destructives" as the true enemies of the neople and of the South. 
In the first years of the war, at least, it does not appear to have 
been the primary purpose of this line of argument to undermine the 
Confederate cause, but rather to protect and to further the position of 
Holden and his associates.  Holden's action in signing the ordinance of 
secession had not been sufficient to restore him to the good graces of 
the Democratic party leadership, and he with other former Union men now 
found himself outside the political mainstream.  This group, together 
with other discontented elements, soon found common ground, and by 1862, 
had coalesced sufficiently under Holden's leadership to permit the form- 
ation of a new political party, the Conservatives.  This group first 
75Ibid., September 11, 18, 1861; February 5, 1862. 
76Ibid., March 12, 1862.     77Ibid., September 14, 1861, 
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supported William A. Graham for governor in 1862, but when Graham de- 
clined to run, the names of several other persons, including Holden, 
John Gilmer, Bedford Brown, and Zebulon B. Vance were tentatively offered. 
Vance was finally chosen as the strongest candidate.  A former Whig, 
beginning his second term in the United States House of Representatives 
when the secession crisis climaxed, he had remained a unionist until 
the attack on Fort Sumter.  He then resigned his seat in Congress and 
organized a company of "Rough and Ready Guards".  Stationed in Eastern 
North Carolina, he was, in September, 1861, elected colonel of the 
Twenty-Sixth North Carolina Regiment and received his first combat 
79 
experience at Newbern in March, 1862. '  He was thus the ideal Conserv- 
ative candidate, having opposed secession as long as possible, but sup- 
porting the war when it came. 
The Democratic party, alarmed by this sudden political threat, 
adopted the name Confederate and nominated William Johnston, Commissary 
General of the state and president of the Charlotte and Columbia Rail- 
road.80  The campaign was largely carried on by the party newspapers, 
the Confederates charging that Vance's election would indicate to the 
North that Union sentiment was dominant in North Carolina, and the 
Conservatives calling for reform in government as essential to the suc- 
cessful prosecution of the war.  The Standard, hailing Vance as the 
people's candidate, urged, 'It is of the utmost importance that the gov- 
ernment should be reformed.  We have good constitutions, both State and 
78 
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Confederate,...but   the administration   of  the government  must  be reformed, 
81 and that   speedily,   or  ruin will  overtake us  all." Against  Confederate 
charges   that  Vance was   the  union candidate,   Holden pointed to  his military 
record,   noting  on the other   hand  that   "the  exploits of.. .Colonel   Johnston, 
are confined  to  a narrow circle.     He won his   title among  the pork and 
beans  of   the Commissary  Department."     The Standard also made much of 
Johnston's   connection with  the Charlotte and  Columbia  Railroad,   declaring, 
"Mr.   Johnston   has  shown,   by  establishing the  South-Carolina  guage  in this 
State,   and  by  turning  our   produce   to Columbia  and Charleston,   instead of 
to Wilmington   and to   Beaufort,   that   his   feelings  are with South-Carolina." 
Throughout   the  campaign Vance was  offered as   the candidate for  a  vigorous 
prosecution  of   the war. 
Vance won   the  election by a   large majority,   receiving  54,423   of  the 
74,871   votes  cast,   and carrying all   but  twelve counties   in the  state. 
83 
The Conservatives  also gained control   of  the State Legislature. Holden 
announced  that   this  Conservative victory amounted to a   popular   declaration 
that  the  old  Union men were   as   loyal   as any;   "that  the  proscrintion 
against   them shall  cease;   that   favoritism and partyism   in the government 
shall  give place  to patriotism." The charges  of  favoritism temporarily 
disappeared  from the pages   of   the  Standard,   to  be revived by the  split 
between   Holden and  Vance   in   1864,   and  their opposition   in the guberna- 
torial   campaign  that   year.     In the   interim,   Holden, who again became 
State  Printer,   continued  to  defend  himself  and  the Conservative  party 
against  charges of  disloyalty,   blaming  the   "original   secessionists"   for 
82 
U. 82. 'Standard,   May 28,   1862. "Ibid.,   August  6,   1862. 
83Yates,   p.   18. 84Standard,   August  20,   1862. 
27 
Southern failures.  With the 1864 campaign, the Standard  resumed its 
accusations of Dartisanship in the state government, declaring that 
Vance had joined the "destructives", and had continued the "stalIfederate" 
system in Raleigh, whereby government officials or "shade officers" were 
ft s 
given special privileges. "  Denunciations of the secessionists continued 
through the war. 
A second divisive theme which may be found in the Standard was the 
further development of the "rich man's war" idea which Holden had used 
in his anti-secession campaign.  He was by no means alone in expressing 
this idea, and in the western areas of the state particularly, it fell 
on fertile soil, as this region was dominantly a non-slaveholdlng, small 
farming region, where the enforcement of the conscription laws threatened 
to remove most of the male population and where the hardships of the war 
were felt with great severity.  Holden frequently called attention to the 
various exemptions permitted by the conscription laws which tended to 
favor the wealthy, the most objectionable being the so-called "twenty- 
Negro law", which provided for the exemption of one white man for each 
twenty slaves, to serve as an overseer.  He noted the hardshlos which each 
expansion of the age limits brought to the upland counties, where, he 
86 
pointed out, three-fourths of the white men worked in the fields. 
The Standard opiosed the impressment and tithing acts of 1863 on 
similar grounds, charging that the latter, by which farmers were re- 
quired to give one-tenth of their produce to the Richmond government, 
worked a particular hardship in these areas and was unequal in its 
85 lb id., June 22, 1864, et passim.  These charges were not without 
some justification, as Vance and his associates evidently had purchased 
personal supplies from the state at government prices.  See Yates, p. 105. 
86 Ibid., February 5, August 20, 1862, March 1, 1863. 
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operation,   as   it   tended  to  deprive  these citizens  of a   large  portion of 
their   propertv,   while   those who   held  property   in   other   forms were  not 
,  87 enually  oppressed. 
In a   similar vein,   Holden   freauentlv called  attention  to the  treat- 
ment   of  the common  soldier.     As   early  as  September,   1861,   the Standard 
was  protesting  the poor pay  allotted  to  the private,   charging that   in 
88 most   cases   he did not   receive   even that. This   theme persisted  through- 
out   the war.     As   late  as   1864,   Holden was still  urging  the cause of   the 
"humble private who   fought   like   a   lion  and  died...",  while both the 
praise and   the  Day went  to   the  officers. 
This   entire   line  of  argument was   condemned by  Holden's  enemies as 
part   of  an   intent   to  create dissatisfaction with  the Confederate 
Government   and with   the war   effort   (as   it  no  doubt  did),   but  as   the hard- 
ships  of   the war  increased   it   became  an   increasingly popular and  telling 
argument.     Holden was   able  to  note on   several   occasions   that   his   sub- 
90 
scription   list,   particularly   "west  of   the Ridge",  was growing,       indicating 
that   an  increasing  portion   of   the population  agreed with his views. 
Another divisive  theme  appearing   in the  Standard,   again reflecting 
the  thinking  of many  North Carolinians,   was   the  charge  that   the  state 
was  being  unfairly   treated  among  the  Confederate  States.     The first 
comment   of   this   nature in  the   paper  appeared  shortly after the act   of 
secession,  when  Holden  noted  that the Confederate Government at 
Montgomery  had   fired  no  salute  when word arrived  of the  secession   of 
North Carolina,   although this   had been done   in  response   to the secession 
89 
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of  the  other  states. Other  petty comolaints   followed.     When the Con- 
federacy,   in  September,   1861,   acted  to  reimburse  Florida  $300,000  for 
damage  suffered   from Federal   attacks,   Holden announced,   "We are   opposed 
92 
to petting   any   state  above another...." On another  occasion,   reporting 
that   the war  was  not   going well   in Virginia,   he  declared  that   it  was 
"high  time  that   South-Carolina,   Georgia,  Alabama   and the other States 
93 had thrown a larger force into Virginia.'' 
Of a more serious nature, and more disturbing to many North 
Carolinians, was the charge, frequent in the Standard, that while the 
state was carrying more than her share of the burden of the war, she was 
not receiving the recompense due her.  A major issue was the matter of 
military promotion.  While the state provided about one-sixth of the 
total Confederate trooDS, the number of high-ranking officers fron North 
Carolina remained far below this percentage.  Of eight full generals in 
the Confederate Army, none was a North Carolinian.  Of twenty-one lieu- 
tenant Generals, two were from the state; of ninety-nine major generals, 
there were twenty; of four hundred eighty brigadeers, there were twenty. 
A natural result of this was that many North Carolina regiments were in- 
corporated into brigades from other atates, under the command of non- 
North Carolinians.  This situation gave rise to frequent complaints 
within the state and among North Carolina troops, and Governor Vance 
94 
frequently called  it   to  the attention of  the Confederate government 
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Further dissatisfaction was created in the state by the manner in 
which conscription was enforced, as conscripts had been promised the 
privilege of choosing their regiment if they entered the service willingly, 
but were subsequently being assigned to regiments without regard to this 
agreement.  This matter again brought Governor Vance into conflict with 
the Confederate government, as he warned Davis that the enforcement of 
a law so unpopular was difficult at best, and was made increasingly so 
by this abuse.  He also reminded Davis of the political situation in 
North Carolina--"that the original advocates of secession no longer hold 
the ear of our people"--and that the continuing support of the former 
Union men was necessary to hold North Carolina for the Confederacy. 
Holden blamed this policy for desertion among North Carolina troops, and 
called for compliance with the agreements made with the conscripts.  "If 
men are to be handcuffed to fight for liberty, let them at least have 
97 
those   rights which  the   law  secures   to  them...." 
In  the matter  of  conscription,   further   offense was given to North 
Carolinians by  the appointment   in   1863   of a   Virginian,   Colonel   T.   P. 
August,   to  serve  as   enrolling  officer   for North  Carolina  conscripts, 
leading Vance  to  demand of  Secretary of War  Seddon  that  some more satis- 
factory arrangement  be made. 
Holden   lost   no opportunity  to complain  of   all   these matters,   blaming 
the  situation on  the prejudice of   the  original   secessionists against 
North Carolina because  of   her slowness   in seceding,   and sometimes going 
to  the   length of   urging  the  people to   resist Confederate authorities. 
96Vance  to  Davis,   U.   S.,  War Department,   War  of   the Rebellion,   the 
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In civil as well as military offices, there was much feeling in 
North Carolina that the state was being discriminated against.  There 
was some basis for this, as during the entire life of the Confederacy, 
cabinet appointees from the state number two--Thomas Bragg, who served 
briefly (1861-62) as attorney general, and George Davis, who served in 
the same capacity in 1864-65--while the number of North Carolinians in 
other appointive positions was "not conspicuous" in comparison with 
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numbers from other Confederate States.    Holden frequently noted that 
the state held too few oositions in the Confederate Government, as in 
November, 1861, when a change in the cabinet resulted in a vacancy in the 
attorney generalship, the Standard declared: 
North-Carolina has been proverbially modest in pre- 
ferring her claims to reoresentation in the cabinet.... 
None have [Sic3 furnished more men or means to support 
the war, or moved with greater alacrity in defense of the 
South, all other things being equal.  Yet she has shared 
meagrely in the offices of the government. 
Holden recieved the news of the appointment of former Governor Bragg to 
101 
this post with oraise, '"  but the following spring this complaint re- 
appeared, when he noted that North Carolina had received only two of the 
thirty-three committee chairmanships of the permanent Congress, these 
being "of an ordinary character." 
The single incident of this nature which created the strongest pro- 
test in the state was the appointment of a Virginian, Bradford, to super- 
vise the collection of produce under the "tithing law".  Holden vigor- 
99 i T. Lefler and A. R. Newsome, North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 
University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 430 
100November 6, 1861.     101Ibid., November 27, 1861. 
102lbid., March 5, 1862. 
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ously protested this appointment and called on the people to resist it.10^ 
In addition to these varied charges of unfair treatment, the 
Standard frequently suggested that the defense of the state was being 
neglected.  The matter of the coastal defenses of the state was a constant 
source of irritation between North Carolina and the Confederacy, and again, 
Holden was not alone in complaining of the issue.  From the beginning, 
the war did not go well in North Carolina.  In August, 1861, Hatteras 
fell to the enemy after a brief assault, and the forts protecting the 
inlets at Oregon and Ocracoke were abandoned without a fight, leaving 
Albemarly and Pamlico sounds open to enemy operations.  The following 
February, Roanoke Island also fell to Federal forces, who then easily 
occupied Elizabeth City, Washington, Plymouth, and Newbern.  From this 
vantage point, Federal troops began raiding the Eastern counties and 
threatening the Wilmington-Weldon Railroad, vital as a supply line for 
the Confederate forces in Virginia.  This unsatisfactory situation 
created serious discontent in North Carolina, and Vance constantly 
pressed the President and the Secretary of War to provide adequate 
troops for the defense of the state, although Confederate strategy 
called for only a sufficient force in North Carolina to prevent capture 
104 
or serious damage to the Wilmington-Weldon line. 
The Standard frequently called attention to the precarious position 
of Eastern North Carolina, urging from the beginning of the war that the 
coastal defenses must be strengthened.  With the fall of Roanoke Island, 
Holden declared that the casualties there were "the predestined victims 
of a military murder, which resulted from, neglect or inefficiency ", and 
declared that the treatment of North Carolina in regard to her defense 
103 Ibid., July 3, 14, 1863. 
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Yates, pp. 20-21, 
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called for investigation "both here and at Richmond."105  He frequently 
noted the condition of the «*stern counties, calling this area the gran- 
ary of the South, and questioning the failure of the Confederate Govern- 
ment to devote a larger force to the defense of the area. 
We are not ignorant of the claims of other States and 
sections.... But is it not a matter of the first importance 
to our interests in Virginia that the Wilmington and Weldon 
Railroad be preserved intact,  and that the rich crops of 
those counties be placed beyond the reach of danger? 106 
Holden also frequently expressed concern for the defense of the state 
as a whole, objecting to new levies of troops and supporting the "Ten- 
Regiment Bill" introduced in the State Legislature at the beginning of 
1863 to raise ten regiments for local defense, in conflict with Confed- 
erate conscription laws.     Here again, local jealousy came into play, 
as he frequently opposed further contributions of troops from North 
Carolina until other Confederate states should supply their full quotas. 
This theme of unfair treatment for North Carolina was one of the 
most effective divisive arguments to be found in the pages of the 
Standard, and became a major factor in the peace movement in 1863-64, 
when it was usually mentioned in the resolutions of the peace meetings 
as a major grievance. 
I05Standard, February 19, 1862. 
107Ibid., January 16, 1863. 
106 Ibid., October 15, 1862. 
CHAPTER IV 
THREATS OF DESPOTISM 
One of Che dominant themes to be found In the Standard is the threat 
of despotism through the loss of civil liberty and state sovereignty. 
This theme, raised in connection with almost every aspect of Confederate 
policy throughout the war, had been foreshadowed in the secession crisis 
by Holden's frequent warnings of the aristocratic and despotic nature of 
the Confederacy. 
Always central in Holden's writings was his insistence on popular 
government.  During the debate on secession,  he had maintained this oos- 
ition, and in the secession convention he was among those suDDorting an 
unsucessful attampt to require popular ratification of the ordinance of 
secession.108  Throughout the war, the statement of the principles of the 
editor carried periodically in the Standard invariably began, "The 
Democratic principle--that is--the right of the people to rule."  As 
early as December, 1861, stating that constitutional liberty no longer 
existed in the North, he warned against an increasing tendency in that 
direction in the South.  Charging that there was an idea abroad in 
Virginia to limit suffrage, he demanded the right to vote for every 
white, free, tax paying male, and cautioned his readers, "Every attack, 
whether open or covert, on the right of suffrage  as at present exercised 
among us, proceeds from the friends of strong government and the enemies 
108 Ibid., June 12, 1861. 
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of   free   institutions." In  1863,  with his   committment   to  the peace 
movement,   Holden asked  that   the  people not   hesitate to  voice  their opinions 
on the matter,   and  suggested  that  any  action  directed toward  peace  should 
be  subject   to  popular   anproval.     He urged that   the people  remember   "that 
they are   sovereign--that  they are  the masters   of  those who administer  the 
government--that   the  government   was   established by  them,   for  their  oene- 
fit...."110 
In  connection with his   insistence on popular   sovereignty,   Holden 
consistently condemned   the   governments   of North Carolina   and of  the 
Confederacy   for   their   policy of   sometimes conducting government   business 
in  secret,   and  called   for   the publication of   votes  on matters   such as  the 
conscription  act,   which he   opposed.     While   he admitted  the  occasional 
necessity  of   secret   sessions,   he   insisted  that   "matters   in which  the 
jeople  are  directly concerned should  be accessible to  them nlM 
It is very difficult to persuade an honest man that 
deception can at any time be good '->olicy; but when it is 
systematically practiced to the practical overthrow of 
the principles of government itself, it is a declaration 
that the government is an evil and ought to be abolished. 
The Standard fought throughout the war for freedom of the press, as 
was to be expected.  In January, 1962, Holden warned his readers that the 
question of restricting the press was then being discussed in secret 
session at Richmond and asked: 
Will the Southern people submit to this entering wedge 
to despotic rule? If so, let them get ready to yield every 
shred of civil freedom. If the Congress in the face of the 
Constitution have the right to pass such a bill, what is to 
hinder them from depriving the people of the freedom of 
10QIbid., December 11, 1861.    110Ibid., July 17, 1863. 
llllbid., March 5, 1862.       112Ibld., August 13, 1862. 
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speech, of the right to discuss or to investigate the conduct 
of their public agents, or to nullify or suspend habeas 
corpus? ilJ 
The possibility of the loss of the privilege of habeas corpus was a 
major theme in Holden's warnings of despotism.  In October, 1862, he 
noted the passage of a bill in the Confederate House of Representatives 
permitting the President to suspend the writ in certain cases. 
Such a measure, if passed, would place the personal 
liberty of every citizen of the Confederate States at the 
mercy of the President.  Can such a measure by necessary? 
We do not believe it is.--What are we fighting for?  Con- 
stitutional liberty.  Let us not, then, destroy it while 
we are in the very act of securing it. "* 
With the passage in 1864 of a measure authorizing President Davis to sus- 
pend the writ in cases of treason, resistance of Confederate authority, 
incitement to resistance, or adherence to the enemy, Holden announced 
the temporary suspension of the Standard in protest.  This action was 
doubtless motivated in part by self-defense, as he was among those 
clearly intended by the act.  Through the efforts of Vance, who urged 
Davis that such action would only weaken the campaign against the peace 
movement, the writ was never suspended in North Carolina after the pass- 
age of the 1864 law, although suspensions did occur in every other state 
In his defense of civil liberty, Holden also noted the failure of 
the Confederate government to create the Supreme Court provided for by 
the Constitution, charging that this left the executive and legislative 
departments free to violate the Constitution, as the citizen had no re- 
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ll5Clarence  D.   Douglas,   "Conscription  and the Writ  of   Habeas Corpus 
in North Carolina,"   Historical   Papers   of  the Trinity   College Historical 
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course.    On another occasion he asked whether the absence of a court 
did not mean that the citizens of the Confederacy were under not the 
government provided by the Constitution, but rather "under a government 
of one man, and that man President Davis." 
Parallel to his defense of individual liberty, Holden constantly 
deplored the threat of Confederate violation of state sovereignty, al- 
ways refusing to admit that the exigencies of war might necessitate a 
great degree of centralization.  While affirming his loyalty to the 
Confederacy, he usually emphasized his primary loyalty to North Carolina, 
and held it his duty to criticize any measure "which puts at hazard and 
eminently jeopards [Sic5 the vital interests of North-Carolina, especially 
110 
during this war."    This position led him to oppose even measures which 
he admitted were of value, as on one occasion when he declared hinself 
gratified by the interest of President Davis in the construction of a 
railroad through the state to Danville, Virginia, but added, "We do not 
concede to the Confederate government the right to engage in works of 
119 internal   improvement   in the  States...." 
While the  charge   that   the  rights  of   states were  being   infringed was 
brought   up  in  connection with almost   every  alleged violation  of civil 
liberty,   Holden especially  emphasized this   in connection with  the con- 
scription   laws   and the   frequent conflicts  between Confederate military 
authorities   and state  officials  over matters which  he   felt   lay within 
116Standard,   September 24,   1862. 117Ibid.,   February  24,   1863. 
118 Ibid. , November 27, 1863. 
119Ibid., November 27, 1863.  Upholding the doctrine of state sover- 
eignty ma7"n"ot have been the primary notive in this case, as North Carol- 
inians generally opposed the construction of this road, fearing that it 
would mean abandonment of the Wilmington-Weldon line, and that consequently 
the defense of the Eastern part of the state would be further neglected. 
See Yates, p. 22. 
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the province of the civil authorities. 
Despite the grave oroblems facing the Confederate Government in 
trying to raise and maintain an army, Holden steadily opposed the use 
of conscription, denouncing it as the 'growth of older and despotic 
soils."    Publishing a resunS of the Conscription Act of April, 1862, 
he declared that it ignored the rights of the states and violated the 
Constitution.  "We regard it as inexpedient, unnecessary, oppressive, 
121 
and unconstitutional....  We enter our protest against it."    The 
Standard continued to protest each further expansion of the ape limits, 
and throughout the war maintained that a volunteer system would have 
been better.  "It was a dark day for the Southern Confederacy, when the 
volunteering system was abandoned, and the Conscription resorted to.  We 
122 
doubt very much whether liberty can be achieved by desnotic means." 
His attitude toward conscription reflected the opinion of many North 
Carolina leaders, including Vance, although the Governor insisted that 
123 
the law must be obeyed.     The state, as Holden asserted in the Standard 
of January 2, 1863, accepted conscription as a necessity, but "never 
acquiesced in the principle of conscription...." 
The attempts of the Confederate government to reduce the shortage of 
arms by impressment, under orders from Davis, provided Holden with another 
occasion to charge violation of state rights and constitutional liberty. 
The Confederate Constitution, he argued, guaranteed the right to keep and 
bear arms, and the state needed whatever arms its citizens had for its 
120 Ibid.,   September   3,   1862. 
121 Ibid.,   April  23,   1862, 
122Ibid. ,   November  26,   1862.     His  position never changed;   years   later 
he noted   in his  Memoirs   (p.   27):     "The war   should  have been a   voluntary  one, 
and  if   force  had been necessary  to   be used   to put men  in  the  Southern  army, 
that   force  should have  been used by   the  states  themselves,   and not   bv  the 
Confederate Government." 
123Douglas,   p.   10-12. 
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own defense, yet Jefferson Davis "is scarcely warm in his seat, to 
which he was called by the general acclaim of the whole people, before 
he 'requests' one of his agents to violate material portions of the 
Constitution which he has sworn to support."  Holden added that he did 
not charge Davis with "improper" motive, but warned the people to be on 
124 
guard against despotism. 
Actions of Confederate military authorities in conflict with civil 
authorities in North Carolina was a major source of disagreement between 
Raleigh and Richmond.  The Standard protested each such case.  When the 
Reverend R. J. Graves was arrested for treason, and removed to Castle 
Thunder at Richmond without benefit of civil action, Holden charged that 
125 
the action was "the very essence of despotism."    He similarly objected 
to the constant arrests of supposed conscripts and deserters by Confed- 
erate troops without civil warrants.  With the publication in early 1863 
of Secretary of War Seddon's report to Davis on the civiliam prisoners 
being held under military authority at Salisbury prison, he declared 
correctly that in many cases these persons had been denied due process of 
law, as proper charges had not been filed and trial was being denied. 
There were, in fact, three prisoners listed in the report with no charges 
126 
preferred. 
The most serious disagreement in this area arose over the action of 
Confederate military personnel in re-arresting conscripts freed by North 
Carolina Chief Justice Pearson on writs of habeas corpus.  These cases 
involved men whose substitutes in military service had subsequently been 
124Standard, April 16, 1862.    
125Ibid., December 12, 16, 1862. 
126Ibid., April 17, 1863.  For a detailed account of this problem, 
see Yates, Chapter IV.  Governor Vance was kept busy throughout the war 
investigating these cases and securing the release of persons improperly 
held. 
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conscripted under  the broadening  age   limits,   and who  had  then been con- 
scripted  themselves   to   replace  their   substitutes.     Justice Pearson  had 
ruled  that  men   losing   their substitutes   in   this manner were not   liable 
to conscription  under   laws not   in  effect   at   the time the  substitutes 
had been  hired.     The military  authorities were advised by  the  Secretary 
of War  at Richmond   that   this   opinion was  not  to be  regarded  as binding, 
and the arrests  continued.     Said  the Standard:   "It   is cool,   conclusive, 
and contemptuous.     The  opinion  of  the Chief Justice of our  State  is 
trampled under   foot  by   the Military...."     '     This  conflict  between the 
state and the Confederacy continued   until   Vance,   insisting  that   the 
Confederate authorities  must   accept   the decisions  of  the State Courts   as 
binding,   was   able to arrange   for  a   decision on the matter by   the  full 
Court   in June,   1864.     As   he  had  hoped,   the Court  overruled Justice 
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Pearson and   the matter ceased  to  be  an  issue. 
Holden   carried  his warnings   of  despotism so  far as  to charge,   as   he 
had  in  the pre-war  period,   that   a desire   to  establish a monarchy was   to 
be found  in   the Confederacy.     In December,   1862,   commenting  on an article 
from  the Atlanta   Intelligencer which   listed  several   acts  of  a  nature   in- 
dicating  such  a   tendency,   Holden   expressed  his  fears  that   such a desire 
did  exist,   and  even   stated that   he   "knew"   of  such   sentiment   among North 
Carolina   "destructives".       He urged  the people  to   be wary of  this  ten- 
dency,   to   "hold  to the great   sheet   anchor of your   liberties — the Bill 
of Rights--the Constitution—the due  enforcement   of   the   laws —the sub- 
ordination of   the military to   the civil   power—the   liberty  of   the press 
and   freedom  of   speech." 
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CHAPTER  V 
THEMES OF DEFEAT--THE  PEACE  MOVEMENT 
Parallel   to  themes of  division  and warnings  of  despotism,   the  pages 
of  the   Standard were   filled with material   of  a  discouraging or  defeatist 
nature,   culminating   in   1863   in  the  peace movement.     From   the beginning of 
the war   the  tone of   the Standard was not  wholly  optimistic.  At   the  out- 
set,   Holden urged   that  the defeat   of  the North was   possible,  but   that 
it must   be accomplished  quickly. Within a month,   however,   he was   ex- 
pressing  the view that   the war would probably be a   long   one,   "     and  by 
the following   spring  he was   denouncing   the  "fantastic  blindness"  of   those 
132 who had   expected a   quick victory. 
In  the   early months  of   the war,   the Standard  frequently called 
attention to   the weakness  of   the  defenses of   the  state,   and while urging 
the necessity  of   stopping  the   enemy   in  Virginia,   reported that   events 
there were   discouraging. In these  first months also,   Holden raised 
the spectre of  a   slave revolt   if  the militia   of  the  state were to  be 
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called   out   for   the general   defense. 
By   late   1862,   the Standard was  openly pessimistic   in regard   to  the 
war.     In an  editorial   entitled  "This   Bloody War",   appearing on October 
8,   1862,   Holden declared that   the   ruin   to both North and   South was   already 
130Ibid.,   July   18,   1861. 131Ibid.,   August   14,   1861. 
132ibid.,   March   5,   1862. 133july 24,   1861. 
13*Ibid.,   November   13,    1861. 
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incalculable,   and asked,   "Where   is   the  ruin  to  end?"     The  South     he 
argued,   could   hope  for nothing   from  the North  or  fro:!.  Europe, but 
must   rely on God and   "the   valor  of  our  troops."    This   editorial   seems   to 
mark  the   turning point   in   the attitude   of  the Standard.     Prior   to this 
time  there had   been occasional  comment   of   an   encouraging  nature,   but   for 
the remainder   of  the war,   its  view was  almost wholly   pessimistic. 
Overtones   of  impending  defeat   frequently were   explicit   in  Holden's 
comments  on other matters,   as   in   his   threats   of disaster   to  the  state 
through  the enforcement   of  conscription  and   impressment.     In  some cases, 
more subtle notes  of  defeatism mav   be   detected,  as   in his  observation  on 
January  2,   1863,   that   there was   danger   that   the Richmond-Petersburg 
Railroad might   be cut.     Holden asserted  that   Lee would be able   to  hold 
Richmond   in  spite of   this,   but   as   it was   generally  conceded  that   this 
supply   line was   essential   to  the  defense of   the Confederate Capital, 
such an observation would  be disquieting.     In  other  cases,   what  may be 
regarded  as   defeatist  was  merely accurate   reporting   of  the  events  of  the 
war,  which were   in  themselves   sufficiently  discouraging.     Where  other 
papers   frequently minimized  Southern   losses,   the  Standard did not.    One 
such   example   is   the  Battle  of Gettysburg,   which Holden  reDorted as a 
serious  defeat   for   the South,  while  the  State Journal   (the party news- 
paper)   declared a month after  the battle,   "Our army   is  in  splendid con- 
dition,   and   is   stronger   than when   it   crossed  into  Pennsylvania." Such 
contrasts were common,   and   left   Holden  vulnerable  to  the charge of  defeatism. 
In  the weeks   following  his   October 8   editorial,   the   editor   frequently 
135Never,   from the  beginning   of   the war,   did  the Standard   regard 
European intervention on   the behalf of  the  South as  a  possibility. 
136August   6,   1863. 
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took note  of   the  condition  of  the  Eastern part  of   the  state,   and  hinted 
darkly  at   further  Federal   occupation.     He also began   to  raise  the  threat 
of  starvation,   which became a   recurring theme  in  the  Standard,   closely 
tied   to   his  opposition to   iimressment  and conscription  in his   appeals 
to the poorer  sections   of   the  state.   "       As   the war  progressed,   he  ever 
more  frequently warned  of   total   subjugation,   military occupation,   and 
immediate  abolition  of  slavery. 
Throughout   the war,   Holden opposed as   hopeless,   any  effort   of  the 
Southern armies   to   take the offensive.     Receiving word of Lee's   invasion 
of Western Maryland   in the  fall   of   1862,   he  declared   that  such  a maneuver 
destroyed  any   hope  of  an   early   end  to the war,   and would surely  fail. 
"When was   it   ever known   in history that  five millions   invaded  and con- 
quered a  peace  from  twenty-three millions?"    The South,   he  declared, 
would do well   just   to  defend  herself,  while  such  an   expedition could  only 
weaken her  and   leave  her  open  to  further   invasions  by Federal   troops. 
He concluded:      "The  prospect   is  by no means  bright  or cheering.     We  are 
no alarmist,   but  we must   deal   frankly with  our readers.     Still   greater 
,138 
sacrifices and sufferings are before us.1 The Standard took a similar 
139 
position in regard to the Gettysburg campaign, " and as the war pro- 
gressed, abandoned all hope that the South would be able to hold what 
territory she possessed, much less reconquer what she had iost. 
The most striking and discouraging of all Holden's editorials 
appeared in the July 17, 1863, issue of the Standard, in which he com- 
137Standard, March 17, 1863; May 18, June 15, 1864. 
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mitted himself openly to the peace movement. 
It is a great crime, especially at a time like this, 
to conceal the truth from the people. We intend to tell 
them the truth as far as we know it, let the consequences 
be what they may. 
From the beginning of the war...the enemy has slowly 
but surely eained on us....  We have lost Missouri, Ken- 
tucky .Tennessee, the Mississippi valley, Texas, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and considerable portions of other states.... 
Our recruits in the way of conscripts  will scarcely keep 
our regiments full,  and we cannot hope to add materially 
to our forces.  Our fighting population is pretty well 
exhausted.  Everybody knows this.--The North knows it and 
so does Europe.  On the contrary, our enemies, flushed 
with triumph, have a large army in the field, and their 
President has just called for three hundred thousand more. 
He will get them....  We have nothing to hope for from 
foreign nations, and just as our cause is, we see no in- 
dications that Providence is about to interpose in our 
behalf.  The war, then, will go on. One side or the other 
must conquer.   Will five million whites conquer twenty 
millions of the same race? Northern troops are not cowards, 
--they fight nearly as well as Southern troops.  We cannot 
achieve signal victories over them on their own soil. 
These are sad truths, but we feel it to be our duty 
to lay them before our readers. 
44 
From this time forward, the Standard was openly and plainly opposed 
to continuing the war effort, calling in every issue for peace talks, 
and declaring that the only outcome of continued fighting would be the 
total defeat and subjugation of the South. 
The Standard had begun to look toward peace early in the war.  In 
the beginning, while maintaining that a majority of the Northern people 
opposed the war, Holden declared that "they appear to be still deceived 
as to the real purpose of the South.  It is folly to talk now of a re- 
construction."141  "The North may as well understand us, that the South 
will never give up.  Our very women will go the the battlefield if need be, 
141Ibid., July 3, 1861. 
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before the South shall be conquered."    By mid-1862, however, the 
Standard began to look toward peace in the near future as a desirable 
objective, and Holden was finding it increasingly necessary to defend 
himself against charges that he favored reconstruction.    His editorials 
from this time forward were punctuated with expressions of hope for 
peace, calling on "clergy and Christians" to pray for such a consummation. 
He began to pave the way toward better relations by urging that a dis- 
tinction must be made between the Northern People and their government 
144 
and by deploring the cultivation of hatred for the former.    The "best 
friends of humanity and the truest of patriots," he insisted, were the 
advocates of peace in both sections. 
What appears to be the first gesture in the direction of an organized 
movement for peace appeared in the June 5, 1863, issue of the paper, as 
Holden published, without comment, the following excerpt from a letter 
to the editor: 
Whenever the proper time arrives I think the news- 
papers North and South ought to cultivate and encourage 
a better feeling between the sections. Elect sensible 
and good men, who will make at least one effort for an 
honorable settlement of our differences. 
The reaction to this "feeler" must have been satisfactory, as Holden the 
following week urged peace talks, and suggested that the South must be 
willing to compromise. 
Is it not time that good men everywhere were uniting 
on some means to arrest this awful  evil?  Negotiations 
must be resorted to at some future period, for to suppose 
142Ibid., June 12, 1863. 
143 Ibid., June 25, 1862. 
144 Ibid., March 17, June 12, 1863.    145Ibid., June 12, 1863, 
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otherwise   is   to anticipate  an  endless war;   and   the  States 
on this   continent  can never   live   in   peace without  some 
mutual   concessions  and compromises.*^ 
In almost   every  issue thereafter,   Holden called   f or  peace  talks. 
He urged   that   the  South must  continue   fighting,   uut   at  th e  same  time 
jst  make  an   effort   to  end  the  conflict    >y negotiations,   before her 
Bargaining  position became even  weaker.     While his   proposals as   to  the 
form which  negotiations   should   take varied,   he always  stipulated that 
any  action  taken must  be  subject   to popular  ratification.     In  an  edit- 
orial   of  July   17,   1863,   he offered a   proposal,  which  he attributed to an 
unnamed  friend,   that   the  next   congressional   elections  turn on   the 
question  of  appointing a   commission  to  treat   for  peace,  with   the premise 
that   their  actions   be  submitted   to   the  people.     While the Standard 
usually   looked   toward  action  in  cooperation with  other Southern  states, 
Holden did   suggest   on at   least   one  occasion  that  negotiations   by a 
separate   state might  be necessary,   as  the constitutional   position of   the 
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North  estopped   negotiations with  the Confederacy as  a  government. 
This   led   to   the charge,   which  he was   later  to deny,   that   he  favored   the 
secession  of  North  Carolina  from the Confederacy,   and  the negotiation  of 
a   separate   peace.     Ultimately,   in  early   1864,   Holden came  to   favor a 
convention   to work  for peace. 
The course of   the Standard met  with considerable public   approval, 
for   during   the   latter part  of  the summer  of   1863  more than  one  hundred 
"peace meetings" were held  in   the state,   beginning   on July   14,   in Green 
County.148     The resolutions  passed  at   these meetings were very  nearly 
identical,   recounting  the grievances   of  North Carolina against   the Con- 
146Ibid. 147Ibid.,  August   25,   1863. 
148Ibid.,   July 21,   1863. 
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federacy in such matters as military administration, unfair treatment, 
out-of-state officials in North Carolina, conscription, tithing, and 
impressment, and invariably concluding by approving Holden's position. 
The resolutions frequently used the language, as well as the motifs, 
of the Standard, leading to the accusation, which Holden always denied, 
that they originated in his office.  The resolutions of the first few 
meetings did not mention the subject of peace, but by the end of July, 
they began to incorporate a proposition declaring "That we would hail 
with joy any movement by the great body of the oeoole North and South, 
which might promise to lead to an honorable and lasting peace."    By 
this time almost all the correspondence published in the Standard in- 
dicated a desire for peace, and Holden stated that he was receiving two 
hundred letters a week, nearly all in this vein. 
As was to be exoected, the editor's activities soon became a source 
of increasing concern for both state and Confederate leaders, and ulti- 
mately led to an open break between Holden and Governor Vance.  While the 
Governor was in sympathy with many of the complaints expressed in the 
Standard and in the peace meetings, and himself worked constantly with 
the Richmond authorities for the alleviation of these grievances, he 
could not approve Holden's course in regard to peace.  He agreed that 
peace should be sought, but felt that it must be by action of the Con- 
federate Government rather than by individual states.  Vance attempted 
to persuade Holden to drop his support of the peace movement, and pre- 
vailed upon other prominent men in the state to use their influence to 
discourage him, but with little sucess.  Holden would agree only to 
149 Ibid.,   July 28,   1863. l50Ibid. ,   July 21,   1863. 
48 
declare that   he and Vance were not   in accord  on  the  peace question. 
Despairing   of this  course,   but   unwilling   to  be  the author   of   the  in- 
evitable clash between himself   and   the powerful   editor,   the  governor 
hesitated   to  attack   Holden openly.      He did,   however,   privately urge  the 
party press   to denounce him,   and  issued  a  proclamation on September 8, 
1863,  calling  for compliance with  the   laws,   however distasteful,   and 
warning  the   people  of  the state  that   the  evils   of  one revolution could 
not   be cured by  starting  another. 
At   the   same  time,   however,   Vance  defended   Holden  from  repression by 
the Richmond  government,   personally  calling on  Davis   to  inform him that 
most  of   the   grievances   on which  the  peace movement   fed could be  removed 
by  fairer   treatment   of   the state.     Determined  to maintain   the supremacy 
of civil   law in  his   state,   he warned Davis  that   the  use of   force would 
only  strengthen   Holden's   hand. 
Holden's activities  also created concern   in the army.      By the   second 
year  of   the war,   desertion  had become  a  serious   problem  for   the Confederacy, 
and   it was   generally  acknowledged  that   North Carolina   troops were  the 
worst   in  this  respect.     Confederate military  authorities  blamed much of 
this on the   "peace mongering"   of  the  Standard,   as  did many of  the  soldiers. 
To  this  charge,   Holden  retorted  that  desertion   resulted  from the  hardships 
and disasters  at   the   front   and  the   inefficient   and partisan course  of the 
authorities  at   home,   and  filled the pages  of  the Standard with  editorials 
152 
and notices deploring desertion and urging absentees to return to the armies. 
153 
151Yates,   Dp.   87-91. 152Bardolph,   p.   184. 
153A  complete   listing   of   such material would  be much   too  long,   but 
examples  may  be  found   in  the   issues   for  July 30,   August   27     October 8, 
ld62;     March 31,   June  26,   1863;     August   17,   Seotember 7,   28,   1864,   and 
March 22,    1865. 
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Nonetheless,   attempts  were made  to  prevent   the  circulation of   the   Standard 
in  the  armies,   both  officially and unofficially.154 
A more  direct  attempt   to  supress   the Standard  occurred on September 9, 
1863,  when members   of  Benning's  Georgia  Brigade,   passing   through Raleigh, 
wrecked   Holden's  office but   failed  to  destroy   the press.     Governor  Vance 
found   it  necessary   to come   to  the  scene to disperse   the mob.     The   following 
day,   friends   of  Hoi den retaliated with a more   thorough  job  of wrecking 
the rival   State Journal,   smashing  the  press.     Again Vance was called upon 
to quiet   the crowd  and to  prevent   similar action against   the Register. 
For  several   days   thereafter  there were  threats   of  further  violence   from 
troops   passing   through the city,   and Vance was   finally  forced to   request 
that   President  Davis   prevent   soldiers   passing   through North Carolina   from 
entering  Raleigh.   " The  Standard  resumed publication on  October  2,   and 
the call   for  peace continued  unabated. 
When the November congressional   elections   resulted   in the election of 
a number of  peace men, Governor Vance  became convinced   that  the Confed- 
eracy must  at   least  make  a  gesture  toward  negotiations,   advising   Davis  that 
this,   if   it   failed,   would  unify   the  people of   the state behind  the war  effort, 
and would   in  any   event   remove  the chief weapon  of  the peace group.     Davis  re- 
Dlied  that   this   had  been  done with  no   sucess.and urged Vance to   take a  strong 
stand against   the  peace movement.       Vance's associates offered  similar advice, 
15^Raper,   p.   71;   Standard,   October   16,30,   1863. 
155Raper,   op.   69-70;   Standard,   October 2,   1863. 
156Estimates   vary on   this  point.     The  Petersburg,   Virginia,   Register 
(November 27,   1863)   claimed that   five of  the ten congressmen were  peace 
nen;   the Standard   (February 3,   1864)   claimed  seven.     Quoted  in Yates,   p.   94. 
157OR,   Ser.I,   LI,   pt.2,   pp.   807-810,   cited  in  Yates,   pp.   94-95. 
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and when he learned that the peace men Intended to oppose his re-electior 
in 1864 if he refused to call a convention to seek peace, he finally 
resolved to break with Holden.  Holden denied that it was his purpose to 
defeat Vance, asserting that the "people of the State have a right to 
re-elect Gov. Vance and they have a right to defeat him.  We shall go 
158 
with the people hereafter, as heretofore."    A call for a convention 
was begun, however, with a meeting in Johnston County, where a series of 
resolutions were passed endorsing both Vance and Holden and calling for 
such a convention.  Holden denied authorship of the resolutions, which 
were reportedly comnosed by him, but supported this meeting and the 
several which followed. 
As Vance determined to oppose the peace movement in North Carolina, 
the Confederate Government attacked the movement with the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus on February 15, 1864, effective until August 1, 
in cases involving, among other things, "advising or inciting others to 
abandon the Confederate cuase, or to resist the Confederate States, or 
to adhere to the enemy."159  Holden temporarily suspended publication of 
the  Standard, ostensibly in protest, and Governor Vance protested to 
Davis that the measure, if enforced, would only hamper his efforts to de- 
160 
feat the peace movement in the state. 
Vance began his campaign against the Holden forces at Wilkesboro, 
on February 22, in a speech distributed throughout the state, denouncing 
the call for a convention and urging the people to stand by the Confed- 
159r 158Standard, January 20, 1864.      Douglas, p. 37. 
160 Yates, pp. 99-100. This protest resulted in an angry corres- 
pondence between Vance and Davis, till the latter requested that Vance 
confine himself to official business in any future communication. 
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eracy.  Holden responded by resuming publication on April 6, to announce 
his candidacy for the governorship, standing on his record as a conserv- 
ative ''after the straightest sect" and charging that Vance had abandoned 
the Conservatives and joined the secessionists. 
The campaign which followed was marked by vicious attacks on the 
part of the candidates, with Vance stumping the state, while Holden 
campaigned through the Standard. His cause was badly damaged by accus- 
ations that he belonged to the "Red-strings" or Heroes of America, a 
secret organization for the purpose of securing reconstruction.  Holden 
denied membership in the organization,    and final proof that he be- 
longed was never offered, but apparently members of the group were in- 
structed to vote for him and were told that he was a member. 
When the results of the vote in the army were known, two weeks be- 
fore the regular elections, it became apparent that Holden would lose.  The 
final vote of the state was probably 57,873 to 14,432,   although the 
164 
Standard reported the returns as 43,579 to 28,982.    Holden charged 
throughout that he was defeated by fraud; that intimidation was used against 
the soldiers,whose ballots were reportedly opened and examined,   that 
166 
troops were sent to polling places to threaten civilians,    and that 
non-North Carolinians were permitted to vote.   He may have been justi- 
fied to some extent in these charges, as there were occasional instances 
161 Standard,   July 6,   13,   27,   1864. 
162 Yates,   p.   106;   Raper,   p.  83. 
163North  Carolina,   Senate.     Journal.   1864-1865,   P.   75;   cited   in 
Yates,   p.   98. 
164Standard,   August   17,   1864. 165Ibid.,   August 3,   1864. 
166Ibid. ,   July  29,   August  3,   1864.        167Ibid. ,   August   3,   1864. 
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of complaints by soldiers that they had not been permitted to vote for 
1ALQ 
Holden. Also, while it was customary that the ballots or "tickets", 
which each candidate printed for himself, were printed on white paper, 
Vance had his printed on yellow paper,169thus making it possible to 
identify the votes as they were cast, which would suggest that some 
intimidation was intended. 
Following the election, Holden announced that he was "neither dis- 
mayed nor depressed by the result of the recent elections in the state," 
but for the moment took a more cautious position on the peace question, 
denying that he had favored the withdrawal of the state from the Confed- 
eracy or reconstruction.  He declared, however, that his views on the 
war were unchanged and that he would continue to follow the will of the 
people. 1™ 
In the same issue Holden published an excerpt from the Richmond 
Enquirer, with endorsements by the Conservative (Vance's party paper) and 
the Confederate at Raleigh, calling for an armistice and declaring that 
"if the Union can be restored...the recognition of the Confederate States 
would not stand in the way."  These papers had opposed the peace move- 
ment, and while noting his gratification that they were "coming to their 
senses," Holden "wondered" why he was the traitor, as they were now 
going further than he ever had.  The Standard continued to call for peace 
and to express the view that action by the states would be necessary, 
as the Richmond government and that at Washington--"the two extremes"— 
would never give the nation peace. 
168 Raper, p. 82. 169 Standard, July 20, 1864. 
170 Ibid., August 17, 1864. 
CHAPTER VI 
RECONSTRUCTION 
The end of the war came quickly in North Carolina.  Fort Fisher, 
protecting Wilmington and the blockade running trade, fell to Federal 
forces on January 16, 1865, and the fall of Wilmington followed on 
February 22.  With the loss of these vital points and the approach of 
General Sherman's army, despondency in the state became overwhelming. 
Efforts by Vance to rally North Carolina troops and to encourage deserters 
back to the lines at Richmond fell on deaf ears.  The Governor refused 
to consider frequent suggestions that North Carolina attempt to secure 
peace, declaring that he would not be a party to the dishonor of the 
state, and that she would have to stand by the Confederacy to the end of 
the conflict.  To President Swain of the University, however, he priv- 
ately admitted that the despondency in North Carolina "shows what I have 
always believed: That the great popular heart is not now and never has 
been in this war." 
Holden attacked the refusal of Vance and the legislators to seek 
peace,*72 an(j called for negotiations, arguing that slavery was doomed 
in any event and that it was useless to sacrifice another man for a dead 
institution.173 
*71Quoted in: Richard E. Yates, "Governor Vance and the End of the 
War in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical Review, XVIII (October, 
1941), 323. 
172Standard, January 11, 1865.    I73Ibld., January 18, 1865. 
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Fayetteville fell to Sherman on March 11, and on April 10, learning 
of Lee's surrender at Appamattox, General Johnston abandoned his earlier 
plans to try to defend Raleigh, and notified Vance that he was with- 
drawing to the western part of the state.  Preparations were then made for 
the removal of the state government.  The state records and vast amounts 
of military supplies which Vance had secured through blockade running 
were transferred to points further west.  Leaving the mayor in charge of 
surrendering the citv, and asking Sherman to spare the charity institutions, 
the museum and the capitol, Vance withdrew on April 12 to General Hoke's 
camp west of Raleigh.  Federal forces entered the city the following day, 
unchallenged and almost without violence.  Little damage was done to the 
city, with the exception of the offices of the Confederate newspapers, 
the Conservative and the Confederate, which were wrecked.  The Progress, 
a union paper favorable to Holden, and the Standard were unmolested, 
although the former did receive a reprimand for criticism of Sherman's 
army.1™ 
Holden began publication on April 17, of the Daily Standard, 
carrying at the masthead the celebrated quotation from Daniel Webster, 
"Liberty and Union, Now and Forever, One and Inseparable," and urging 
the citizens of the state to submit to Federal authority. 
And now a word to the people of North Carolina.  We 
have been pleading for peace for the last two years, but 
the State and Confederate authorities insisted on fighting 
it out, and as it has been evidently fought out, we now 
appeal to the peoole of the State to submit to the laws 
and authority of the United States, and stop the worse 
than useless shedding of blood. 
Simultaneously he began to pave the way toward reconstruction, declaring 
mYates, "Governor Vance and the End of the War...'', p. 328-331. 
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that the existing state government did not reflect the wishes of the 
people and had been elected by fraud, and calling for the formation of a 
new government. 
Reporting the death of Lincoln, Holden praised Andrew Johnson as a 
self-made man.  "We know him well.... We believe he will make a safe and 
able president."  Looking toward what was to be Johnson's plan of recon- 
struction, he noted that "Our people will need, for months to come, the 
strong arm of military power to protect them in their pursuits and to 
restore order to society."  5  This was followed by a suggestion that a 
provisional governor should be appointed, to be supported by military 
power; that this governor then call a state convention to order the 
election of a new governor and legislature; that this legislature then 
fill the seats of the state in the national Congress; that by this method 
"a new State Government will be established deriving its existence im- 
mediatly  from a Union people." 
To what extent Holden was familiar with Johnson's intentions at that 
time is uncertain, but it is evident that he was in communication with 
Johnson during the war, when the latter was military governor of 
Tennessee, '  and it is probable that he was at least partially familiar 
with the plan which his editorials now foreshadowed. 
On May 9, Holden received a wire from Johnson asking him to come to 
Washington.  Together with several other prominent North Carolina unionists 
Holden met with the President and plans were made for establishing a 
provisional government in the state.  It was apparent to all that Holden, 
175 Daily  Standard,  April   20,   1865. 
176Ibid.,   April   24,   1865. 
177 OR,   Series  I;   LI,   pt.2,   p.   739,   Series   IV;   II,   p.   784,   III,   p.   807. 
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as the most outspoken Union man in the state, was the logical choice for 
provisional governor.  His appointment was announced on May 29, 1865, 
and he assumed his duties immediately. 
Holden, in his provisional governorship, was faced with serbus 
problems.  The state was bankrupt, local government was for the most 
part non-existent, and race-relations were worsening, particularly in 
the Eastern part of the state, where the presence of Negro Federal 
Troops was a source of discontent in the white population.  One of the 
most difficuly responsibilities facing the governor was the necessity of 
considering and commenting on hundreds of applications for presidential 
pardon, to which he had to attach a recommendation before forwarding 
them to President Johnson.  Although he was criticized within the state 
for delay in approving pardons for a number of the more prominent men 
in the state, Holden appears to have been generous, refusing pardon 
absolutely in the case of only four persons, all of whom he felt to be 
irreconcilable rebels. 
The first months of his term having been spent in organizing local 
governments and making necessary appointments, Holden, on August 8, 1865, 
issued a call for the election of delegates to the convention which was 
to prepare the state for readmission to the Union.  The convention met on 
October 2, in Raleigh, and proceeded to repeal the secession ordinance, 
abolish slavery, repudiate the state's war debt — these three actions 
being required by President Johnson--and to provide for the election on 
November 9, 1865 of a permanent state government.     Holden was a candi- 
date for the governorship in this election, but was defeated by Jonathan 
178Raper, pp. 89-90.    179Ibid., p. 78. 
180Lefler and Newsome, p. 455. 
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Worth,   provisional   state  treasurer and,   like  Holden,   a   former  Union man,181 
who  took   office   on December 28,   1865. 
Events were  to provide  Holden with   further opportunity,   however. 
With   Radical  control   of Congress,   and  the passage of   the Reconstruction 
Acts   of   1867,   abrogating   the existing   state  government  and  calling   for 
the  election,by white and Negro  voters,   of   a  new constitutional   con- 
vention,   he again moved to  the  forefront   in North Carolina  politics. 
He was by   this   time associated with  the Republican or Radical   party   in 
the  state,   against which were grouped,   under   the name of Conservative, 
those political   elements  unwilling to accept   Congressional   reconstruction. 
The  new constitutional   convention,   elected  on November   19-20,   1867,   con- 
tained   107  Republican  delegates   and   13  Conservatives.     A new constitution 
was  written, meeting   the Congressional   requirements,   and April,   1868, 
was   chosen   for   the vote on ratification and   for the  election of  new state 
officials.     The  constitution was   ratified and Holden,   running  on  the Rep- 
ublican   ticket,   was   elected  governor  over Conservative Thomas  S.   Ashe, 
182 
receiving   92,235  votes   to   73,594   for Ashe. He was   inaugurated  governor 
on July   2,   1868,   over   the protest   of  Governor Worth,  who  declared  that 
the   election was  not  valid,   and   that   the new government  officials were 
1 ft T 
"appointees of   the military  of  the United  States." 
Holden1s   tenure  as  regular governor of  North Carolina,   unlike  his 
sucessful   provisional   governorship,   was marked by  numerous   unfortunate 
occurrences,  which  served   to discredit  him  in the  eyes  of much of   the 
population.     The major  issues were  the carpetbagger   frauds and  the 
"Kirk-Holden War".     Holden was  apparently not   a participant   in  the 
181Raper,   p.   136. 
183Holden,   p.   111. 
182 Ibid.,   pp.   150-152. 
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former,   involving  the   fraudulent   issue and   sale  of  thousands  of   rail- 
road bonds,   but   as  these   frauds   occurred during   his  administration,   it 
was  felt   that   he  should  have prevented them. The  second  issue,   the 
"Kirk-Holden War",   arose out  of   the  activities  of  the various  Ku Klux 
Klan-type  societies   in  the  state,   and  resulted  in  the  destruction of 
Holden's  political  power   in North Carolina. 
These  terroristic  groups  became  active   in North Carolina   in   1867, 
and shortly  after  his   election  as  governor,   Holden  issued a  proclamation 
warning   them that   they were   liable  to arrest  under the  laws  governing 
treason.     This warning,   and the  passage of   a   law making it  a   felony  to 
go about   disguised,   saw no   results,   and Klan depredations   in  some parts 
of  the   state worsened.     Finally,   in  January,   1870,   Holden  secured  passage 
of a   law granting  him  the   authority  to use military  power  to restore 
18 5 
order   in areas which he  judged  to be   in a   state  of   insurrection. It 
was  charged  that   Holden   intended   to use this  power to control   the August 
elections,   but   this  seems   unlikely,   as   it was used  in  only   two  counties. 
With  the murder,   in Alamance County,   of  a  Negro   Republican  official, 
and   in  Caswell  County,   of   J.   W.   Stephens,   a   state  senator  and   Holden 
la/ 
supported   engaged  in  anti-Klan  activities, Holden  declared   these  two 
counties   in a   state of  insurrection,   and ordered   them  occupied by troops 
newly   recruited   for  the purpose,   under  the  command  of George W.   Kirk, 
notorious   in Western North Carolina   for  his   Union  raids during   the war. 
These   counties   remained  under military   law until   after the  fall   elections, 
and a   number  of  citizens  were  arrested and   detained without   charges  and 
187 
in violation  of writs  of   habeas   corpus  issued by Justice Pearson. 
l84Lefler  and Newsome,   pp.   464-465;  Raper,   p.   155. 
185Raper,   pp.   158-161. lS6Lefler and Newsome,   p.   466. 
187Raper,   pp.   166-170. 
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With  the   election of   five Conservative Congressmen and  of  a  Con- 
servative maiority  of  more  than   two-thirds   to   the Ceneral  Assembly, 
Holden   declared  the   insurrection   ended  and  disbanded   his   troops.     He  had 
by   then   lost   the  confidence  of most of   the population,   however,   and  the 
Conservatives  were determined  to   remove   him from office.     Thus,   a  res- 
olution  to   impeach was  adopted  and  Holden was  charged with   eight  offenses, 
including   having   declared  states   of  insurrection   in Alamance and Caswell 
counties   for   the purpose of   subverting civil   liberty  and civil   law,   having 
illegally  ordered  the  arrest  and  detention  of  several   persons,   among  them 
Josiah  Turner  of   the Raleigh Sentinel,   having refused  to obey writs  of 
habeas  corpus,   and   having unlawfully  spent   state  funds  for  the  reimburse- 
ment   of   the troops   emploved against  the Klan.     His  trial,  which  lasted  two 
months,   was  controlled by his  opponents  and  resulted   in his  conviction,   on 
March 22,   1871,   on  six  of the eight charges.     He was   removed   from office 
and  permanently   disqualified   from  holding   public office   in North Carolina.188 
Thus  barred  from political   life  in   his  own   state,   Holden considered 
for   some  time  accepting   either  a   diplomatic  post   or the  editorship of  a 
party  newspaper   in Washington,   both of which were tendered  him by the 
Republican  party.     He chose  neither,  becoming  instead  the political   ed- 
itor  of   the Washington  National   Chronicle.     He remained with   the Chronicle 
one  year,   and   in   1873   returned  to Raleigh  as  a  Federal   postmaster,   a 
position which   he held  until   1881.     Here   ended  his  public career—two 
years   later  he  cut   his   ties with  the Republican  party.     He remained  pol- 
itically   independent   until   his  death  in   1892.     Three   times  at   least, 
188Ibid.,   pp.   180-134.     For  a   detailed  account   of  Holden's   trial 
and  conviction,   see Lowell  T.   Young,   "The   Impeachment  and Trial   of Gov- 
ernor William W.   Holden,   1870-71"   (Unpublished M.   A.   thesis,   Department 
of   History,   University  of North Carolina  at Greensboro). 
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suggestions were made to Holden that an attempt be made to secure removal 
189 
of his disabilities,    but he discouraged this, feeling that "I did not 
want the people to be excited and angry about it [,j which would follow 
debate in the two Houses.... I cannot beg for my pardon and thus admit 
my guilt.... In all I did I had only in view the maintenance of the law 
and the quiet and happiness of the Deople."    The disabilities were 
never removed. 
Holden, in his later years, seems to have been strangely free of bitter- 
ness for a man to whom enmities had been common.  His Memoirs reflect a 
mellowed and resigned attitude toward the part, and many unpleasant de- 
tails, such as his treatment by his party in the 1858 campaign, go un- 
mentioned.  Of Vance, whom he had bitterly attacked, he declared, "I 
state unreservedly...that che] was and is, [the3 foremost man in all 
191 
cNorth Carolina's] annals, old and new."    Of his disabilities, surely 
the sorest ooint of all, he said, "I cherish no resentment toward any 
person for what has occurred in the past.  I am at pcce, or would be, 
with all men."192 
189 
191 
Raner, p. 190. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
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192 
Holden, pp. 181-182, 
Ibid., p. 183 
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